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Abstract. We show how employee stock options can be valued under
the new reporting standards IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (revised) for share-
based payments. Both standards require companies to expense employee
stock options at fair value. We propose a new valuation model, referred
to as Enhanced American model, that complies with the new standards
and produces fair values often lower than those generated by traditional
models such as the Black–Scholes model or the adjusted Black–Scholes
model. We also provide a sensitivity analysis of model input parameters
and analyze the impact of the parameters on the fair value of the option.
The valuation of employee stock options requires an accurate estimation
of the exercise behavior. We show how the exercise behavior can be
modeled in a binomial tree and demonstrate the relevance of the input
parameters in the calibration of the model to an estimated expected life
of the option.
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1. Introduction
In many firms, employee stock option plans are an
important part of employee remuneration. In the
last decade, there has been a debate by accounting
standard-setters, firms, academics, and politicians
about whether employee stock options should be
expensed. Recently, the International Accounting
Standards Board (IASB) and the Financial Ac-
counting Standards Board (FASB) have issued
their share-based payment standards IFRS 2 and
FASB No. 123 (revised), respectively. Both stan-
dards require employee stock options to be recog-
nized as an expense. This expense is measured at
the fair value of the employee stock option, de-
termined at the date of grant. Now that the
recognition issue has been determined, the focus
has shifted to the application of these standards,
specifically to how the fair value of employee stock
options should be computed. Given the fact that
there is currently no generally accepted model, the
Standard Boards decided not to put forth a
valuation model. The guidance provided by the
standards focuses on limiting the measurement
possibilities and states that the accounting objec-
tive is to estimate the fair value of the employee
stock options.
Employee stock options have a number of char-
acteristics that prevent their valuation by standard
option-pricing models (such as vesting or blocking
periods, non-transferability, exit rates, etc.). By
neglecting these restrictive features of employee
stock options, standard models such as the Black–
Scholes model or the standard binomial model
overestimate the value of the options. One of the
first papers on valuing employee stock options is
SMITH and ZIMMERMAN (1976), which uses
the Black–Scholes–Merton model. JENNERGREN
and NASLUND (1993) modify the Black–Scholes
model for forfeitures and early exercise, because
employees leave the firm. HUDDART (1994),
KULATILAKA and MARCUS (1994), and
RUBINSTEIN (1995) develop binomial models
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that determine the employee stock option exercise
scheme that maximizes the expected utility of the
employees. CUNY and JORION (1995) model the
possibility that the employee might leave the firm
prior to maturity and, consequently, have to
exercise or forfeit the options. LAMBERT et al.
(1991) show that employee stock options can be
worth substantially less to risk-averse and non-
diversified employees. CARPENTER (1998),
HULL and WHITE (2004), and AMMANN and
SEIZ (2004) develop binomial models that extend
the ordinary American option-pricing model by
introducing exogenous early exercise and forfei-
ture. The model of CARPENTER (1998) assumes
an exogenous stopping rate. The HULL and
WHITE (2004) binomial model assumes an
exogenous employee exit rate, which is analogous
to the stopping rate of CARPENTER (1998), and
an exogenous early exercise multiple (of the strike
price) at which voluntary exercise occurs. A similar
model of AMMANN and SEIZ (2004) adjusts the
options strike price to account for early exercise.
The models demonstrate that simple contingent-
claims models can describe the exercise scheme
just as well as complex utility-maximizing models.
AMMANN and SEIZ (2004) present a detailed
model comparison and investigate a utility-maxi-
mizing model as proposed by KULATILAKA and
MARCUS (1994), HUDDART (1994), and
RUBINSTEIN (1995), a recent model by HULL
and WHITE (2002, 2003, 2004), and the model
proposed by the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (1995), referred to as the adjusted Black–
Scholes model (or the FASB 123 model). They
show that, with the exception of the adjusted
Black–Scholes model and the standard Black–
Scholes and American models, these models
produce virtually identical option prices if they
are calibrated to the same expected life. In other
words, even though the models tested derive their
exercise policies using completely different ap-
proaches, the pricing effect of the different exer-
cise schemes is negligible as long as the expected
life of the option is the same. Therefore, the
drawback of the dependence on unobservable and
hard-to-estimate parameters, such as the risk
aversion coefficient in the utility-maximizing
model, can be overcome by using the expected
life, which is much easier to estimate, to calibrate
the model.
In this paper, we present a new valuation model
for employee stock options that is in compliance
with the requirements of both standards IFRS 2
and FASB No.123 (R). Furthermore, we provide a
sensitivity analysis of two categories of model
input parameters: First, the plan parameters that
can be specified by the issuing firm in the
employee stock option plan before the grant date
(such as maturity, vesting or blocking period,
strike price and grant date). Second, the estimated
parameters that must be determined at the date of
grant (such as expected volatility, expected divi-
dend yield, risk-free rate, expected post-vesting
exit rate and the expected life of the option). We
analyze the influence of these parameters on the
fair value. Moreover, we discuss how the exercise
scheme can be estimated for a given set of input
parameters. The analysis shows that the expected
life of the employee stock option or the exercise
scheme has to be determined by considering the
model input parameters.
2. Valuation Model Requirements under
the New Reporting Standards
Under the new International Financial Reporting
Standard 2 (IFRS 2 2004) and the revised
Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No.
123 by the Financial Accounting Standard Board
(FASB No. 123 (R), Share-Based Payment),
companies are required to expense employee stock
options at fair value. The standards set out rules
on how to account for share-based payments. Both
standards state that, to date, there is no particular
option pricing model that is regarded as theoret-
ically superior to the others. Entities should select
whichever model is most appropriate in the
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circumstances. For many entities, circumstances
might preclude the use of the standard Black–
Scholes–Merton model. However, the Standard
Boards concluded that it was not necessary to
prohibiting the use of the Black–Scholes–Merton
formula and that generally closed-form models are
one acceptable technique for estimating the fair
value of employee stock options. Rather than
prohibiting the use of the Black–Scholes–Merton
formula, the Standard Boards concluded that the
standards should provide guidance on selecting
the most appropriate model and that it is sufficient
to select a valuation technique that fits a firm’s
circumstances best. The Standard Boards stated
that the effects of early exercise, i.e., the employ-
ees’ option exercise scheme and post-vesting
employee termination (exit of the firm) should
be taken into account (and that these effects can
be accommodated by lattice models). A more
flexible model is likely to produce a more accurate
estimate of the employee stock option’s fair value.
For instance, a lattice model can accommodate
estimates of employees’ option exercise behavior
and post-vesting employment termination (post-
vesting exit-rate) during the option’s contractual
term (maturity), and thereby can reflect the effect
of those factors better than an estimate based on a
closed-form model (e.g., Black–Scholes–Merton
formula) with a single weighted-average expected
life of the options.
The variables used to measure the fair value of an
employee stock option have a significant impact
on the valuation. Generally, the standards con-
cluded that the following factors should be
considered by applying an employee stock option
pricing model: exercise price of the option (X),
contractual life (maturity) of the option (T), price
of the underlying share at grant date (S), expected
volatility of the share price (s), expected divi-
dends or expected dividend yield (D), risk-free
interest rate (r), and the effects of early exercise
(the expected life of the option (EL) and the post-
vesting exit (w2)). Other factors can also be
considered: the blocking periods, long live char-
acter of employee stock options and factors that
market participants would consider. The blocking
period (a period where the employees cannot
exercise their options) is not the same as the
vesting period (period during which the specified
vesting condition are to be satisfied, e.g. a service
condition that requires the employee to complete
the service period in the firm to receive the
entitlement). Generally, for plain vanilla employee
stock options, the two periods are identical (same
beginning and end of the period).
A lattice model can accommodate estimates of
employees’ option exercise behavior and post-
vesting employment termination during the
option’s contractual term, and thereby can reflect
the effect of those factors better than an estimate
based on a closed-form model. Factors to consider
in estimating the early exercise and the effect of
non-transferability include: vesting and blocking
periods, price of the underlying share, expected
volatility of the underlying share, employees’
historical exercise schemes and different exercise
behaviors for homogenous groups with similar
exercise behavior.
The standards require using a so-called ‘‘modified
grant date method’’ to account for the forfeitures
of options during the vesting period (the forfeiture
rate is determined by the pre-vesting employee
exit rate). This rule requires entities to measure
the cost of employee services received in ex-
change for the employee stock options based on
the grant-date fair value of the options. That cost
will be recognized over the period during which
an employee is required to provide service in
exchange for the options i.e., - the requisite service
period (usually the vesting period). No compen-
sation cost is recognized for employee stock
options for which employees do not render the
requisite service. Furthermore, the standards re-
quire for determining the fair value of the
employee stock options that no vesting conditions
(except market conditions) be taken into account.
Therefore, it is important to distinguish between
the pre-vesting exit rate (w1), which is accounted
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for by using the modified grant date method, and
the post-vesting exit rate (w2), which is an input
parameter to determine the fair value of the
employee stock option.
3. The Enhanced American Model
Employee stock options differ from standard
exchange-traded options in important aspects
(see, for example, RUBINSTEIN, 1995). Several
researchers have noted the shortcomings of using
traditional option formulas to value employee
stock options.[1] In the following, we identify the
three main differences and explain how they can
be addressed in a valuation model for employee
stock options:
Vesting or Blocking Period: Employee stock
options can only be exercised after the vesting or
blocking period v. Delayed vesting can be handled
easily by modifying the standard binomial model
such that exercise is not allowed during the
vesting period.
Exit Rate: Employees may be forced to exercise
unexercised but vested options prematurely upon
leaving the firm. Thus, employee stock options are
exercised earlier than optimally exercised standard
American options. The probability of employees
leaving the firm after the vesting period is
modeled by the post-vesting exit rate w2 and
given for each period $t as 1  ew2tð Þ . We
assume that the post-vesting exit rate w2 is
constant over time. If the employee leaves after
the vesting period v, the option is forfeited if it is
out of the money and exercised (immediately) if it
is in the money. Furthermore, if the employee
does not leave after the vesting period, there are
two possibilities: either the option will be volun-
tarily exercised or held.
Non-Transferability: Employees are not allowed
to sell their employee stock options. Because of
this non-transferability feature, a premature
(early) exercise is often the only way of raising
cash from the option. Several researchers have
documented that employee stock options are
exercised relatively early in their term, even
when the underlying stock pays no dividends
(see, for example, HUDDART and LANG,
1996). Such sub-optimal exercise reduces the
option’s value. The time when a particular
employee exercises the option may depend on
several factors such as risk-aversion, liquidity
requirements, diversification motives, non-op-
tion-wealth, expected stock-return, utility func-
tion, underlying stock price, etc. Thus, an
individual exercise scheme will be determined
that characterizes an employee or a group of
employees with similar exercising behavior.
Therefore, for a group of employees of a certain
exercise type, the expected life of the option can
be estimated. For calculating the expected life, we
use the conditional procedure described by HULL
and WHITE (2002), which is an expectation
conditional on the option vesting. Therefore, the
expected life of a set of employee stock options is
defined as the length of time that options remain
unexercised on average given that they vest. We
choose this definition for empirical convenience
because only options that have vested need to be
considered for empirical estimation of expected
life. This definition implies that the expected life
of the option is always smaller than the maturity
because the exit rate is greater than zero after the
vesting period. The expected life is not invariant
to the probability measure. Our definition of
expected life is a risk-neutral expected life. In
risk-averse economies, employee stock options are
exercised sooner than in risk-tolerant economies
(see GARMAN 1989).
We present a new model for valuing employee
stock options that conforms to the new reporting
standards IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (revised),
referred to as Enhanced American model[2]
(EA model). It considers a vesting period (block-
ing period), the possibility that employees may
leave the company after the vesting period (post-
Ammann and Seiz: An IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (R) Compatible Model for the Valuation of Employee Stock Options
FINANCIAL MARKETS AND PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT / Volume 19, 2005 / Number 4384
vesting exit), and early exercise due to the non-
transferability.
The general approach is similar to an American
model that is adjusted for the post-vesting exit rate
and the vesting period, but this model explicitly
incorporates the employee’s early exercise policy.
The incorporation of sub-optimal early exercise is
simple: it consists only of an adjustment of the
strike price of the option. Of course, the adjusted
strike price is used only to determine the time of
exercise, not to calculate the payoff of the option.
The adjustment factor is denoted by a variable M*
that can be interpreted as an exercise acceleration
factor triggering premature or late exercise
depending on its value.
We model the early exercise behavior of employ-
ees by assuming that exercise takes place whenever
there is a positive intrinsic value and the exercise
value adjusted by the factor M* is larger than
the holding value (i.e., maxðSi; j  M*X ; 0 
er$t pfiþ1; jþ1 þ 1  pð Þfiþ1; j ) and the option
has vested. For an exercise accelerator of M* = 1,
the EA-model and the American model adjusted
for the post-vesting exit rate and the vesting
period are the same. For M* smaller and greater
than one, the EA model accelerates or delays
exercise, respectively, and thus allows for an
individual, sub-optimal exercise policy. The En-
hanced American model shows that by making a
very small adjustment to the standard American-
model adjusted for the post-vesting exit rate and
the vesting period, a model with all the employee
stock option features described above can be
obtained in a very simple way.
The exercise accelerator M* used in the Enhanced
American model is similar to the multiple M used
in the HW-model (see HULL and WHITE 2004)
because M* is also a multiple of the strike price X.
However, in contrast to the HW-model, M*
multiplied by the strike price X represents a virtual
strike price of a specific employee. In the EA-
model the employee decides to exercise the option
if he is satisfied with the intrinsic value relative to
his virtual strike price M*X. The value of the
option is maximized if the exercise accelerator
equals one (M* = 1). In contrast to the HW-model,
where the best achievable exercise strategy is still
sub-optimal, this maximum price implies an
optimal exercise policy and is therefore equal to
the price obtained by the American-model adjust-
ed for the post-vesting exit rate and the vesting
period.
The Enhanced American model is implemented
with a generalized binomial-tree method. For the
binomial-tree method, we use the standard spec-
ifications as originally proposed by COX et al.,
(1979). Suppose that there are N time steps of
length $t in the tree and that Si, j is the stock price
at the jth node of the tree at the time i$t and fi, j is
the value of the employee stock option at this
node. Define S as the initial stock price, X as the
strike price of the option, T as the maturity of the
option (time-to-expiration), s as the volatility of
the underlying stock, r as the continuous risk-free
rate, D as the continuous expected dividend yield,
u and d as the up- and down-movement factors of
the stock price, and p as the risk-neutral probabil-
ity for an up-step. For the binomial-tree method,
we used the following standard specifications,
originally proposed by COX et al., (1979), for the
volatility factors:
$t ¼ T
N
;u ¼ e
ﬃﬃﬃ
$t
p
; d ¼ 1
u
; p ¼ e
rDð Þ$t  d
u d
The probability that the employee stock option
will be terminated after the vesting period is
1  ew2$t  in each period $t for a continuous
post-vesting exit rate w2. The decision rules in the
binomial tree are modified accordingly:
The value of the employee stock option in each
node of the tree is denoted by fi,j for time i and
node j. At maturity of the option (i = N), the value
of the option is given as the option’s intrinsic
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value fN, j = max(SN, j j X, 0). For all other nodes
(0 e i e N j 1), the rules are as follows:
– During the vesting period (if i$t < v):
The value of the option is,
fi; j ¼ er$t p  fiþ1; jþ1 þ 1  pð Þfiþ1; j 
– After the vesting period (if i$t Q v):
If there is an exit with probability 1ew2$t ;
the option will be exercised immediately and
the exit value is given by the option’s intrinsic
value, namely max(Si,j j X, 0). Therefore, the
exit component of the option price will be the
probability multiplied by the exit value:
1  ew2$t max Si;j  X ; 0 .
If there is no exit with probability ew2$t, the
option will either be exercised or held:
If the option is exercised, the no-exit compo-
nent of the option price is
ew2$tmax Si; j  X ; 0 :
If the option is held, the no-exit component of the
option price is
ew2$ter$t p fiþ1; jþ1 þ 1  pð Þ fiþ1; j :
The value of the option is the sum of these two
components (exit and no exit):
If the option is exercised:
fi; j ¼ 1  ew2$t
 max Si; j  X ; 0 
þ ew2$tmax Si; j  X ; 0 
¼ max Si; j  X ; 0
 
If the option is held:
fi; j ¼ 1  ew2$t
 max Si; j  X ; 0 þ ew2$t
er$t p fiþ1; jþ1 þ 1  pð Þ fiþ1; j 
The rules for calculating the fair value of the
option f0,0 are: At the end nodes the value of the
option is given as the option’s intrinsic value fN, j =
max(SN, j j X, 0). For all other nodes (0 e i e N j
1), the rules for calculating the value of the
employee stock option are as follows:
– During the vesting period (if i$t < v), the value
of the option is calculated as
fi; j ¼ er$t p fiþ1; jþ1 þ 1  pð Þ fiþ1; j :
– After the vesting period (if i$ t Q v):
If there is a positive intrinsic value (i.e., Si, j j
X > 0) and the exercise criterion, i.e.,
max Si; j M*X ; 0 
 er$t pfiþ1; jþ1 þ 1  pð Þfiþ1; j ;
is satisfied, then the option will be exercised. Its
value is therefore
fi; j ¼ max Si; j  X ; 0
  ¼ Si;j  X :
Otherwise, the option is held and its value is
therefore
fi; j ¼ 1  ew2$t
 max Si; j  X ; 0 
þ ew2$t er$t p fiþ1; jþ1 þ 1  pð Þ fiþ1; j 
The calculation of the risk-neutral expected life
is as follows:[3] Define Li,j as the risk-neutral
expected life of the option at time i$t. The
stock price is Si,j. Set LN,j = 0 for the expected
life at the end nodes. For all other nodes (0 e i e
N j 1), expected life is calculated as follows:
– During the vesting period (if i$t < v), the option
cannot be exercised and, according to the risk-
neutral valuation principle, the expected life, for
a time increase of one binomial step ($t), is
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calculated as (the exit rate is ignored because
the expectation is conditional)
Li; j ¼ pLiþ1; jþ1 þ 1  pð ÞLiþ1; j þ $t:
– After the vesting period (if i$t Q v), expected
life is calculated as follows:
If the option is exercised, then
Li; j ¼ 0:
If the option is held, then
Li; j ¼ 1  ew2$t
 0
|ﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ{zﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄﬄ}
¼ 0
þ ew2$t
 pLiþ1; jþ1 þ 1  pð ÞLiþ1; j þ $t 
The expected life of an option today, i.e., in the
first node, is given by L0,0.
4. Sensitivity Analysis and Exercise Scheme
of Employee Stock Options
4.1 Changing Input Parameters
Plain vanilla employee stock options usually have
a vesting period (v) (generally this is a service
condition, which requires the employee to com-
plete this period of service and is identical to a
blocking period where the options cannot be
exercised) between one and four years and a
maturity or time to expiration (T) between four
and ten years. Furthermore, firms are able to set
the strike price (X). Generally, the strike price is
set to a value similar to the price of the underlying
share (S) at the grant date (at-the-money issue).
Firms are also able to schedule the date of the
grant and therefore firms can define indirectly the
price of the underlying share in a certain range.
Therefore, four input parameters (v, T, X and S)
define the general character of the employee stock
option. These parameters are defined by the stock
option plan and we refer to these input parameters
as the plan parameters. On the other hand, there
are input parameters that have to be estimated at
the date of grant. These parameters are the
expected volatility (s), the risk-free rate (r), the
expected dividend yield (D), the post-vesting exit
rate (w2) and the expected life of the option (EL).
We refer to these input parameters as the
estimated parameters.
In this section we analyze the implication of the
plan and estimated input parameters on the fair
value of employee stock options with option prices
valued by the Enhanced American model, starting
with a standard option described in Table 1. First,
we perform a sensitivity analysis of the two
categories of parameters and examine the effect
on the fair value. Second, we discuss which
parameters determine the exercise scheme.
The fair value of the employee stock option with
the input parameters given in Table 1 valued with
the Enhanced American model is $18.82. In the
following, we change the input parameters by
+10% and j10% and determine the correspond-
ing fair values. Furthermore, it is possible to rank
the sensitivity of the parameters with respect to
changes of their fair values. Below we show that
certain input parameters can have a huge influence
on the exercise scheme. First, the moneyness (S/X)
Ammann and Seiz: An IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (R) Compatible Model for the Valuation of Employee Stock Options
Table 1: Input Parameters for the Standard
Example
Plan parameters (parameters
defined by the employee
stock option plan)
S $50
X $50
T 7 years
v 3 years
Estimated parameters (parameters
estimated at grant date)
EL 5 years
s 50%
r 2.5%
D 1.0%
w2 5.0%
Note:
Table 1 shows the input parameters for the standard example: price
of the underlying share (S ), strike price (X ), maturity or time to
expiration (T ), vesting period (v ), expected life of the option (EL),
expected volatility (s), risk-free rate (r ), expected dividend yield
(D), and post-vesting exit rate (w2).
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can trigger early or late exercise, second, the
proportion between the vesting period and the
maturity of the option (v/T) defines the exercis-
able period and therefore restricts the expected life
of the option, and third, the post-vesting exit rate
(w2) can trigger early exercise of the options.
There are two possibilities to specify an exercise
scheme: (1) calibrate the model to the estimated
expected life (EL) for a given set of input para-
meters (mainly taking into account the money-
ness, the proportion between the vesting period
and the maturity and the post-vesting exit rate),
and (2) calibrating the exercise scheme within the
binomial tree (i.e., valuation with an estimated
exercise accelerator M*).
AMMANN and SEIZ (2004) show that the fair
value is greatly affected by the expected life of the
option. However, the expected life is restricted by
the maturity T and the vesting period v. In a first
step, for changes of the maturity and the vesting
period, we change the expected life such that the
expected life is always in the middle of the
exercisable period (v + (T j v)/2). Below we
show that if there is no such adjustment of the
expected life (i.e., estimating the expected life
regardless of the proportion between the vesting
period and the maturity), the exercise scheme
varies greatly.
Table 2 shows the results of the sensitivity
analysis for the two different parameter catego-
ries. For the plan parameters (input parameters
that are defined by the employee stock option
plan), the most sensitive parameter is the price of
the underlying share (S) at grant date, followed by
the strike price (X). This is similar to the standard
Black–Scholes model, where option values in-
crease with increasing stock prices and decreasing
strike prices. Furthermore, Table 2 shows that the
fair value increases with an increase of the
maturity of the option. Intuitively not obvious is
that the fair value of the option increases also with
an increase of the vesting period. This is caused
by the increase of the expected life (5.15 years
instead of 5.00 years). In other words, the vesting
period forces employees not to exercise their
options sub-optimally. On the other hand, a short
vesting period allows the employees to exercise
their options relatively early (and sub-optimally)
and therefore reduces the fair value. Later we
show that the proportion between the vesting
period and the maturity (v/T ) has the strongest
influence on the exercise scheme and therefore on
the fair value of the option.
For the estimated parameters (input parameters
that must be estimated at the date of grant), the
expected life (EL) is the parameter with the
greatest impact. The expected life defines the
exercise scheme; an increasing expected life
increases the fair value.[4] Similar to standard
exchange-traded options, the volatility has also a
significant influence on the fair value of the
option. Both the risk-free rate and the expected
dividend yield have a relatively small influence on
the fair value. An increase of the risk-free rate and
a decrease of the expected dividend yield increase
the fair value of the option. A special case is the
parameter for the annual post-vesting exit rate
(w2). An increase of the post-vesting exit rate
increases the fair value of the option if and only if
the post-vesting exit rate has no influence on the
expected life. The reason for this is that if the
model is calibrated to a certain expected life (in
the example: five years), a change of the post-
vesting exit rate changes also the exercise scheme
relative to the expected life. Therefore, if the
expected life is fixed, an increase of the post-
vesting exit rate increases the fair value. For large
changes of the post-vesting exit rate, the estima-
tion of the expected life has to be adjusted
(decreased for high exit rates and increased for
low exit rates, relative to standard situations).
Below we show that for large changes of the
parameters S, X, T, v, and w2, the exercise scheme
changes and the expected life EL (or the exercise
accelerator M*) has to be adjusted accordingly.
Figure 1 shows the value of an employee stock
option depending on the expected life and the
volatility. The contractual life T or maturity (7
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years) cannot be reached because the non-zero
post-vesting exit rate (5% p.a.) implies an ex-
pected life of less than the maturity of the option.
Furthermore, there is a minimum expected life
(min EL) for all volatilities and an expected life
equal to the vesting period (3 years) is not possible
due to the expectation character of the model.
The firm defines the following characteristics of
an employee stock option plan: (1) the maturity
and the vesting period and (2) the grant date (or
the stock price) and the strike price of the option.
Figure 2 shows the fair value of the employee
stock option with respect to the maturity and the
vesting period. All parameters are the same as in
the standard example of Table 1 except for the
expected life that is set to the middle of the
exercisable period (v + (T j v)/2). This adjust-
ment causes the exercise behavior to remain
similar. As we have shown above, the fair value
of the employee stock option increases with an
increase in the maturity and the vesting period.
Point 1 in Figure 2 is the standard case with a
maturity of seven years and a vesting period of
three years, which results in a fair value of $18.82.
Using the Enhanced American model the charac-
teristics of the option can be modeled with
different maturities and vesting periods that give
the same fair values (line between the points 1, 2
and 3 in Figure 2). In Figure 2, the option values
of the standard Black–Scholes model are also
shown. The reduction between the option value of
the Black–Scholes model and the Enhanced
American model for large maturities and small
vesting periods can be huge. If the maturity equals
the vesting period (T = v), the Enhanced American
values and the Black–Scholes values converge
because the employees cannot exercise the option
early (point 4 in Figure 2).
Figure 3 shows the fair value with respect to the
expected life and the moneyness (S/X) of the
option, where S = $50 and X varies between
$38.5 and $71.4 (moneyness S/X between 1.3 and
0.7). All other parameters are the same as in the
standard example of Table 1. As we have shown
above, the fair value of the employee stock option
usually increases with an increase in the expected
life. For a given expected life, an increase of the
strike price reduces the fair value significantly.
However, for options that are deep in- or out-of-
the-money at the grant date, the expected life of the
option should be adapted (compared to a standard
case that estimates an expected life of five years)
because expected life is probably not independent
of the moneyness of the option on the grant date.
4.2. Changing Exercise Behavior and Exercise
Scheme
In this sub-section, we analyze the changing
exercise behavior and exercise scheme for varying
input parameters. Above we have seen that the
moneyness (S/X) can trigger early or late exercise,
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Figure 1: Fair Value of the Option with Respect to
Expected Life and Volatility
This figure shows the fair value of the option with respect to the
expected life and the volatility. All other parameters are the same
as in Table 1 for the standard example (S=50$, X=50$, T = 7 years,
v = 3 years, r = 2.5%, D = 1%, w2 = 5%).
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that the proportion between the vesting period and
the maturity of the option (v/T) restricts the
expected life of the option, and that the post-
vesting exit rate (w2) can trigger early exercise of
the options. There are two possibilities to calibrate
the model to a specific exercise behavior/scheme:
(1) estimating the expected life (EL) for a given
set of input parameters (taking into account the
moneyness, the proportion between the vesting
period and the maturity and the post-vesting exit
rate), and (2) estimating the exercise accelerator
M*. Both methods determine the exercise scheme
within the binomial tree.
Figure 4 shows the relationship between the
expected life (EL) and the exercise accelerator
(M*) and the resulting fair value of the option. The
fair value of the option is a function of the ex-
pected life and the exercise accelerator. The
exercise accelerator increases with an increasing
expected life (and vice versa). Exercise acceler-
ators below one accelerate (and therefore result in
sub-optimal) exercise and exercise accelerators
above one delay (and therefore also result in sub-
optimal) exercise.
Figure 5 illustrates the effect of changing exercise
schemes and the possibilities to fix either the
expected life (EL) or the exercise accelerator (M*)
for a given set of input parameters (taking into
account the proportion between the vesting period
and the maturity). Figure 5(a) shows that the fair
value decreases with an increasing vesting period
if and only if the expected life is kept constant at 5
Ammann and Seiz: An IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (R) Compatible Model for the Valuation of Employee Stock Options
Figure 2: Changes of the Plan Parameters: Maturity and Vesting Period
This figure shows the fair value of the option with respect to the maturity and the vesting period. The expected life is estimated in the middle of
the exercisable period (v + (T j v )/2). All other parameters are equal to the standard parameters of Table 1 (S = 50$, X = 50$, s = 50%, r =
2.5%, D = 1%, w2 = 5%). The fair values on the horizontal plane have a value of $18.82 (this is the fair value given by the standard example
in Table 1).
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years. The fair value decreases because the
exercise accelerator M* decreases, indicating that
the exercise scheme changes (employees tend to
exercise their options earlier). Figure 5(b) shows
that the fair value increases with an increasing
vesting period if and only if the exercise acceler-
ator (M*) is kept constant at 0.949 (the exercise
boundary is fixed within the binomial tree which
corresponds to an expected life of 5 years for the
standard parameters of Table 1). The fair value
increases because the expected life (EL) increases
and indicates that the exercise behavior changes
(employees tend to exercise their options later,
due to the increasing vesting period). Moreover,
Figure 5 shows that the expected life and the
exercise accelerator are interdependent parameters
that cannot be determined independently (espe-
cially for input parameters that influence the
exercise scheme such as S/X, v/T and w2).
Table 3 shows the value of the employee stock
options determined with three different models:
the Enhanced American model (EA-model) pro-
posed in this article, the adjusted Black–Scholes
model (adj BS), which replaces the maturity with
the expected life and the standard Black–Scholes
model (BS). Furthermore, Table 3 allows for
different exercise schemes to account for the
changing input parameters (the expected life is
fixed in Panel A, and the exercise accelerator is
fixed in Panel B). Panel A shows that if the
expected life is set to five years, the exercise
accelerator and the EA fair value (determined with
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Figure 3: Changes of the Plan Parameters: Initial Share Price and Strike Price
This figure shows the fair value of the option with respect to the expected life and the moneyness (S/X ). The initial stock price is fixed at
$50 and the strike price varies between $38.5 and $71.4. All other parameters are the same as in Table 1 for the standard example (T =
7years, v = 3 years, s = 50%, r = 2.5%, D = 1%, w2 = 5%). All fair values on the vertical plane have an expected live of five years (initial
estimation for a maturity of seven years and a vesting period of three years).
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the EA model) increases for an in–the–money
grant. However, Panel B shows that if the exercise
accelerator M* is set to 0.949 (this corresponds to
an expected life of five years in the standard
example), the expected life is reduced to 4.85
years for an in-the-money grant X = 45.5. This is
exactly the effect illustrated in Figure 3. In Panel
A, an increase of the vesting period slightly
decreases the EA fair value of the option.
However, Panel B shows that an increase of the
vesting period increases the EA fair value of the
option significantly (EA fair value of $15.29
compared to $8.76). This increase deals with the
different expected lives (vesting periods of 0, 1.5
and 3 years have expected lives of 1.90, 3.77, and
5 years, respectively). The expected life in Panel
B gives an indication of when the options are
exercised (5 years for the standard example,
slightly above and below 5 years for out- and in-
the-money options, respectively, strongly reduced
expected lives for small vesting periods and
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Figure 4: Fair Value of Employee Stock Options
for Changing Exercise Schemes
Exercise accelerator M* and fair value of employee stock options
with respect to the expected life; (S = $50, X = $50, s = 50%, r =
2.5%, D = 1%, T = 7 years, w2 = 5%, v = 3 years). The limit for an
exercise accelerator M* = 1 is given by a standard American model
adjusted for the post-vesting exit rate and the vesting/blocking
period. Exercise accelerators below one accelerate exercise and
exercise accelerators above one delay exercise.
Figure 5: Exercise Schemes and Fair Values for Changing Vesting Periods
Fair value of employee stock options and exercise accelerator/expected life with respect to the vesting period v; (S = $50, X = $50, s =
50%, r = 2.5%, D = 1%, T = 7 years, w2 = 5%). Figure (a) shows that the fair value decreases with an increasing vesting period if and only if
the expected life is fixed at 5 years. The fair value decreases because the exercise accelerator M* decreases and this indicates that the
exercise scheme changes (employees tend to exercise their options earlier). Figure (b) shows that the fair value increases with an
increasing vesting period if and only if the exercise accelerator is fixed at 0.949. The fair value increases because the expected life EL
increases and indicates that the exercise behavior changes (employees tend to exercise their options later, due to the increasing vesting
period).
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slightly above and below 5 years for low and high
post-vesting exit rates, respectively). Furthermore,
Table 3 shows that the reduction of the EA fair
value compared to the (adjusted) Black–Scholes
model can be substantial.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we show how employee stock
options can be valued under the new reporting
standards IFRS 2 and FASB 123 (R) for share-
based payments. Both standards require firms to
expense employee stock options at fair value. We
propose a new valuation model, referred to the
Enhanced American model, which conforms to the
new standards and results in fair values often
much smaller than the values generated by closed-
form models such as the Black–Scholes or the
adjusted Black–Scholes model. We conduct a
sensitivity analysis of model input parameters
and show that the moneyness, the proportion
between the vesting period and the maturity, and
the post-vesting exit rate not only influence the
fair value of the option, but also the exercise
scheme. The analysis shows that it is important to
consider the model input parameters when cali-
brating the model to the estimated expected life or
the exercise scheme because the exercise behavior
can be sensitive to the other input parameters.
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Table 3: Changing Exercise Schemes and Sensitivity Analysis
Panel A: Expected Life
EL = 5 years
Panel B: Exercise Accelerator
M* = 0.949
X v w2 EA M*
adj BS
(T = 5 y)
BS
(T = 7 y) EA EL
adj BS
(T = EL)
BS
(T = 7 y)
50 3 5% 18.82 0.949 +13% +28% 18.82 5.00 +13% +28%
55.5 out-of-the-money 16.24 0.946 +22% +41% 17.22 5.13 +16% +33%
45.5 in-the-money 20.98 0.954 +7% +20% 20.17 4.85 +10% +25%
0 20.78 0.977 +2% +16% 8.76 1.90 +57% +176%
1.5 20.61 0.969 +3% +17% 15.29 3.77 +23% +58%
0 18.18 0.948 +17% +33% 19.07 5.21 +13% +27%
10% 19.69 0.957 +8% +23% 18.06 4.72 +15% +34%
Note:
Table 3 shows a sensitivity analysis of the fair value with respect to the input parameters that are relevant for the exercise scheme, among
other things. X is the strike price, v is the vesting period, and w2 is the post-vesting exit rate. This example uses the standard parameters of
Table 1 (S = 50$, T = 7 years, s = 50%, r = 2.5%, D = 1%). The expected life is fixed in panel A and the exercise accelerator is fixed in
Panel B. Panel A shows that the exercise accelerator (M *) changes when the input parameters changes. Panel B shows that the expected
life (EL) changes when the input parameters changes. The table shows a model comparison of three valuation models: EA is the
Enhanced American model, adj BS is the adjusted Black–Scholes model that replaces the maturity with the expected life and BS is the
standard Black–Scholes model with a maturity of 7 years.
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ENDNOTES
[1] See especially LAMBERT et al., (1991), SMITH
and ZIMMERMAN (1976), KULATILAKA and
MARCUS (1994), RUBINSTEIN (1995), CAR-
PENTER (1998), DE TEMPLE and SUNDAR-
ESAN (1999), HALL and MURPHY (2000a,
2000b, 2002).
[2] The EA model proposed in AMMANN and SEIZ
(2004) is slightly different to the model proposed
in this paper. The only difference of the two
model versions is that the model in this paper
only accounts for the post-vesting exit rate and
not for the pre-vesting exit rate. The standards
prescribe to account for the pre-vesting exit
(termination during the vesting period) by apply-
ing the ‘‘modified grant date method’’.
[3] See HULL and WHITE (2002).
[4] For larges values of the expected life, it is
possible that an increase of the expected life
can reduce the fair value of the option, but if and
only if the underlying stock pays dividends (see
AMMANN and SEIZ (2004)).
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